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We are concerned with the problem of core membership testing
for hedonic coalition formation games, which is to decide whether a
certain coalition structure belongs to the core of a given game. We
show that this problem is co-NP complete when players￿preferences
are additive.
JEL Classi￿cation: C71, C63.




The study of computational complexity in hedonic coalition formation games,
or simply hedonic games, has a short history, although these issues in coopera-
tive and non-cooperative game theory are being gradually recognized. Maybe
the reason is that the formal model of a hedonic game was only recently in-
troduced (cf. Banerjee, Konishi, and S￿nmez (2001) and Bogomolnaia and
Jackson (2002)). This model consist of a ￿nite set of players and a preference
relation for each player de￿ned over the set of all coalitions containing the
corresponding player. The outcome of a hedonic game is a coalition structure
(i.e., a partition of the set of players into coalitions). A coalition structure
is called stable if there is no group of individuals who can all be better o⁄
by forming a new deviating coalition. The core of a hedonic game is the
collection of all stable coalition structures.
Computational complexity issues related to hedonic games in a general
setting are studied by Ballester (2004). As shown by this author, the prob-
lem to decide whether a given hedonic game has a nonempty core is NP-
complete1. CechlarovÆ and HajdukovÆ (2002, 2004) and Dimitrov, Borm,
Hendrickx, and Sung (2004) also elaborate on the computational complexity
of core related solution concepts for hedonic games but in a less general set-
ting, i.e., in games with some restrictions imposed on players￿preferences. In
particular, Dimitrov, Borm, Hendrickx, and Sung (2004) consider preference
pro￿les based on aversion to enemies that consitute a small subdomain of
the domain of additive preferences, and show that ￿nding a core member
for such games is NP-complete. The corresponding preference domains are
formally introduced in the next section.
1For an introduction to computational complexity, de￿nitions of NP, NP-complete,
NP-hard, and a catalog of NP-complete problems, we refer to Garey and Johnson (1979).
2In this note we consider the problem of core membership testing for he-
donic games. Given a hedonic game and a coalition structure, the problem of
core membership testing is to decide whether the coalition structure belongs
to the core of the game. We show that this problem is co-NP complete when
players￿preferences are additive. Indeed, the co-NP completeness is shown
by a reduction to hedonic games in which players￿preferences are based on
aversion to enemies. Hence, the preference domain based on aversion to en-
emies turns out to have a referential role with respect to this computational
complexity issue.
2 Preliminaries
Let N = f1;:::;ng be a ￿nite set of players. A coalition is a nonempty
subset of N. For each player i 2 N, we denote by Ai = fX ￿ N j i 2 Xg
the collection of all coalitions containing i. A collection ￿ of coalitions is
called a coalition structure if ￿ is a partition of N, i.e., all coalitions in ￿
are pairwise disjoint and
S
X2￿ X = N. We denote by CN the collection
of all coalition structures. For each coalition structure ￿ 2 CN and each
player i 2 N, we denote by ￿(i) the coalition in ￿ which contains i, i.e.,
￿(i) 2 ￿ \ Ai.
We assume that each player i 2 N is endowed with a preference ￿i
over Ai, i.e., a binary relation over Ai which is re￿ exive, complete, and
transitive. Moreover, we assume that the preference of each player i 2 N
over CN is purely hedonic, i.e., it is completely characterized by ￿i in such a
way that, for each ￿;￿0 2 CN, player i weakly prefers ￿ to ￿0 if and only if
￿(i) ￿i ￿0(i).
A hedonic game is a pair hN;￿i of a ￿nite set N of players and a pro￿le
￿= (￿1;:::;￿n) of players￿preferences. We denote by G the collection of
3all hedonic games. Let hN;￿i 2 G. We say that a coalition X is a deviation
from a coalition structure ￿ in hN;￿i if X ￿i ￿(i) for each i 2 X. We say
that a coalition structure ￿ is stable in hN;￿i if no deviation from ￿ exists,
i.e., for each coalition X, there exists i 2 X satisfying ￿(i) ￿i X. The core of
a hedonic game hN;￿i, denoted by ￿(N;￿), is the collection of all coalition
structures which are stable in hN;￿i.
Let ￿= (￿1;:::;￿n) be a preference pro￿le. We say that ￿ is additive
if, for each i 2 N, there exists a function vi : N ! R characterizing ￿i in
such a way that, for all X;Y 2 Ai,





For simplicity, by vi(X) we denote
P
j2X vi(j) for each i 2 N and for
each X 2 Ai.
Given an additive preference pro￿le ￿ and any two players i;j 2 N, we
say that j is a friend (enemy) of i if and only if vi(j) > 0 (vi(j) < 0); if
vi(j) = 0, and we say that j is a neutral coalitional partner of i. Finally, we
say that a preference pro￿le ￿ is based on aversion to enemies if ￿ is additive,
and for each i 2 N, vi(￿) 2 f￿n;1g with vi(i) = 1. Hence, restricting players￿
preferences in such a way displays a situation in which each player i 2 N has
very strong enemies, very weak friends, and no neutral coalitional partners.
3 Core membership testing
In this section we study the problem of core membership testing formulated
as follows:
The Problem of Core Membership Testing (cmt)
Given: A hedonic game hN;￿i 2 G and a coalition structure ￿ 2 CN.
4Question: Is ￿ 2 ￿(N;￿)?
This problem belongs to the complexity class co-NP, i.e., the complexity
class containing the complements of the decision problems in the complexity
class NP. The complement of a decision problem is de￿ned as the problem
with the ￿YES￿and ￿NO￿answer reversed. The complement of the cmt
problem can then be described as follows. Given a hedonic game hN;￿i 2 G
and a coalition structure ￿ 2 CN, and ask whether ￿ 62 ￿(N;￿), i.e., whether
there is a deviation X from ￿ in hN;￿i. This problem, the complement of
cmt, belongs to NP, because in polynomial time of n one can
(1) guess non-deterministically a coalition X,
(2) test deterministically whether X is a deviation from ￿ in hN;￿i, and
(3) the answer is ￿YES￿if some coalition X is a deviation from ￿ in hN;￿i,
and otherwise ￿NO￿ .
Hence, the cmt problem belongs to co-NP.
Before we show that this problem is co-NP complete when players￿pref-
erence are additive, let us ￿rst recall some properties of hedonic games with
preference pro￿les based on aversion to enemies. For more details the reader
is referred to Dimitrov, Borm, Hendrickx, and Sung (2004). Let hN;￿i 2 G
be a hedonic game with preference pro￿le ￿ based on aversion to enemies.
It is known that
￿ the core ￿(N;￿) is always nonempty.
In order to describe the properties of core members, let us introduce some
terminology. Let H = (V;E) be a (undirected) graph, where V is the set
of vertices and E is the set of edges, i.e., each edge is a set consisting of
5two di⁄erent vertices from V . A clique X in H is a subset of V such that
fi;jg 2 E for each i;j 2 X with i 6= j.
Let HhN;￿i = (V;E) be a (undirected) graph with
￿ V = N, and
￿ E = ffi;jg ￿ V j i 6= j and vi(j) = vj(i) = 1g,
and let ￿ 2 CN be a core member, i.e., ￿ 2 ￿(N;￿). Then, it is known
that
￿ each X 2 ￿ is a clique in HhN;￿i.
Suppose X is not a clique in HhN;￿i for some X 2 ￿. Then, vi(j) = ￿n
for some i;j 2 X, which implies that vi(X) < vi(i). Hence, X ￿i fig, and
thus, fig is a deviation from ￿ in hN;￿i. Therefore ￿ 62 ￿(N;￿).
Moreover, it is known that
￿ at least one of the largest cliques in HhN;￿i belongs to ￿.
Suppose ￿ does not contain any of the largest cliques in HhN;￿i, and let
X be one of the largest cliques in HhN;￿i. Then, for each i 2 X, we have
vi(X) = jXj > j￿(i)j ￿ vi(￿(i)):
Hence, X is a deviation from ￿ in hN;￿i, i.e., ￿ = 2 ￿(N;￿). It follows from
this property that the problem of ￿nding a core member of a given hedonic
game, with preference pro￿le based on aversion to enemies, is at least as
hard as the problem for ￿nding a largest clique in a given graph, which is a
NP-hard optimization problem.
We are now ready to present our result.
6Theorem 1 The problem of core membership testing for hedonic games with
additive preference pro￿le is co-NP complete.
Proof. As already mentioned, the cmt problem belongs to co-NP. It su¢ ces
to show that this problem is co-NP hard. The co-NP hardness is shown
by a polynomial time reduction from a co-NP complete problem called the
clique problem, which is the complement of the clique problem. The
clique problem is de￿ned as follows:
Clique Problem (clique)
Given: A graph G = (V;E) and a positive integer 2 ￿ K ￿ jV j.
Question: Does G contain a clique of size K?
Let (G;K) be an instance of the clique problem, i.e., G = (V;E) is
a graph and K is a positive integer such that 2 ￿ K ￿ jV j. De￿ne a
hedonic game hN;￿i as follows. Take N = f1;2;:::;K ￿ 1g ￿ V to be the
set of players, and let n = jNj = (K ￿ 1)jV j. For each (k;s) 2 N, the
preference ￿(k;s) of player (k;s) is characterized by the function v(k;s), which





1 if s = t;
1 if k = ‘ and fs;tg 2 E;
￿n otherwise.
Observe that the transformation from (G;K) to the game hN;￿i can be
done in O(jV j4) time. Hence, it is a polynomial time reduction. Moreover,
observe that players￿preferences are, in fact, based on aversion to enemies.
Next, de￿ne ￿ = fXs j s 2 V g with Xs = f1;2;:::;K ￿1g￿fsg for each
s 2 V . Obviously ￿ is a partition of N, i.e., ￿ is a coalition structure. Also
notice that each Xs is a clique of size K ￿1 in HhN;￿i, because v(k;s)(‘;s) = 1
7for all k;‘ 2 f1;2;:::;K ￿ 1g and for each s 2 V . In the following we show
that ￿ 62 ￿(N;￿) if and only if G contains a clique of size K.
(1) Suppose that G contains a clique Y of size K. Then, for each k 2
f1;2;:::;K ￿ 1g, fkg ￿ Y is also a clique of size K in HhN;￿i. Hence, each
fkg ￿ Y is a deviation from ￿, and therefore ￿ = 2 ￿(N;￿).
(2) Suppose ￿ = 2 ￿(N;￿). Then there exists a deviation Z from ￿. Since
each Xs 2 ￿ is a clique of size K￿1 in HhN;￿i, Z must also be a clique of size
at least K in HhN;￿i in order to be a deviation from ￿. Let Z0 be a subset
of Z of size K. Since Z is a clique in HhN;￿i, Z0 is also a clique in HhN;￿i.
Then, by de￿nition, we have either k = k0 or s = s0 for all (k;s);(k0;s0) 2 Z0
with (k;s) 6= (k0;s0).
We show that k = k0 and s 6= s0 for all (k;s);(k0;s0) 2 Z0 with (k;s) 6=
(k0;s0), i.e., Z0 ￿ fkg ￿ V for some k 2 f1;2;:::;K ￿ 1g. Let (k;s) 2 Z0.
Then, there exists (k0;s0) 2 Z0 such that s0 6= s, because jZ0j = K > K ￿1 =
jXsj, and thus, we have k0 = k. We are done when K = 2. When K ￿ 3,
there exists (k00;s00) 2 Z0 such that (k00;s00) 6= (k;s) and (k00;s00) 6= (k0;s0).
When s00 = s, we have k00 6= k, and thus, we have k00 6= k = k0 and s00 = s 6= s0,
so that there is no edge between (k0;s0) and (k00;s00) in HhN;￿i, and Z0 cannot
be a clique in HhN;￿i. The same argument hold when s00 = s0. Hence, k = k0
and s 6= s0 for all (k;s);(k0;s0) 2 Z0 with (k;s) 6= (k0;s0). i.e., Z0 ￿ fkg ￿ V
for some k 2 f1;2;:::;K ￿ 1g.
Finally, since Z0 is a clique of size K in HhN;￿i and Z0 ￿ fkg ￿ V for
some k 2 f1;2;:::;K ￿ 1g, we have fs;tg 2 E for each (k;s);(k;t) 2 Z0.
Therefore, fs 2 V j (k;s) 2 Z0g is a clique of size K in G.
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